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Conisbee1was a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not vegetarianism was ‘capable 
of satisfying the requirement and definition of being a philosophical belief (protected 
characteristic) under the Equality Act 2010’.2Employment Judge Postle held that 
vegetarianism did not amount to a philosophical belief, comparing it to veganism. It is the 
latest in the confusing and contradictory case law on the meaning of the term ‘religion or 
belie’ under English law.3 
This comment contends that not only was the application of the law by the 
Employment Tribunal suspect but that, at times, the articulation of the law was also 
questionable. It falls into three sections, closely analysing and critiquing three parts of the 
judgment in turn. The first and second sections examine the arguments for both sides (as 
articulated in the judgment) since these explain the approach taken by the Tribunal. The final 
part then explores the conclusions reached by Employment Judge Postle. Because this section 
of the judgment is rather cursory, detailed analysis of what the Tribunal says about the 
arguments of counsel for both sides is needed in order to understand the decision given.  All 
three parts of the judgment contain questionable statements of law and the applications of 
law. This suggests that the decision needs to be appealed, because it has the potential to 
create further confusion in an area of the law which is already mired with uncertainty.    
Before exploring the relevant parts of the judgment, a few words are appropriate on 
the background of the case. The Respondents did not dispute that Mr Conisbee was a 
vegetarian, nor that he had a genuine belief in his vegetarianism: however, they argued that 
simply being a vegetarian could not in itself constitute a protected characteristic.4Mr 
Conisbee had been employed by Crossley Farms as a waiter/barman from April 2018 until he 
 
1Mr G Conisbee v Crossley Farms Ltd & Ors [2019] ET 3335357/2018. 
2Ibid. para 1. 
3 See R Sandberg, ‘Clarifying the Definition of Religion under English Law: The Need for a Universal 
Definition?’ (2018) 20 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 132. 
4Conisbee para2. 
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resigned on 30 August 2018 complaining of discrimination on the grounds of religion and 
belief, together with a claim for notice pay.5The basis of his complaint was his allegation that 
in June or July 2018 the third Respondent had called him ‘gay’ because he was a 
vegetarian.6There were also various contested procedural points: what follows, however, is 
concerned solely with the issue of vegetarianism as a protected characteristic – or not. 
 
The Arguments for the Claimant 
 
On the vegetarianism point, the first submission on behalf of Mr Conisbee was summarised 
by the Tribunal as follows:   
‘a finding to say that the Claimant’s vegetarianism is nota protected characteristic 
would not defeat his claim. This is because, harassment merely needs to “relate” to a 
protected characteristic (together with the other components of s.26) and as such the 
victim need not possess the protected characteristic to succeed. Miss Bewley submits 
this made clear in the examples given at s.99 of the explanatory notes of the Equality 
Act 2010’.7 
The first sentence is ambiguous. The issue of whether vegetarianism is a protected 
characteristic was precisely what the case was about and would determine whether or not the 
claimant had a claim for discrimination. The second sentence is non-controversial but does 
not follow from the first. It is settled law that harassment merely needs to ‘relate’ to a 
protected characteristic and it is also settled law that the victim does not have to possess the 
protected characteristic in order to succeed.8This would be relevant if the claimant was 
alleging discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation but it is difficult to see its relevance 
in relation to alleged religion or belief discrimination because the claimant was indeed a 
vegetarian.  The examples given in the Explanatory Notes of the Equality Act, paragraph 99 
make it clear that unwanted conduct which is related to a protected characteristic 
constitutesharassment where it creates an intimidating environment for those who do not 
 
5Ibid. para 7. 
6Ibid. para 56. 
7 Ibid, para 14.  
8For example, in Austin v Samuel Grant (North East) Ltd [2011] ET/2503956/11, an  Employment Tribunal 
found that the Claimant had been harassed on the grounds of his sexual orientation when he was referred to as 
‘homosexual’ and ‘gay’ by colleagues – even though he was not – after he had told them that he did not like 
football. It held that, despite him not being homosexual, that was not required under the Equality Act 2010 and 
that his ‘perceived’ homosexuality meant that the Act protected him. Similarly, in Otomewo v The Carphone 
Warehouse Ltd [2011] ET/2330554/2011, when two of the claimant’s work colleagues used his iPhone without 
his permission and updated his Facebook page to read, ‘Finally came out of the closet.  I am gay and proud’, an 
Employment Tribunal held that their action amounted to harassment on grounds of sexual orientation. 
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share that protected characteristic.9Again, the relevance of this to this case is questionable. 
The definition of harassment under section 26 of the Act makes it plain that for harassment to 
have taken place there must be ‘conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic’. For 
harassment on grounds of religion or belief, therefore, a finding that vegetarianism is 
incapable of constituting a philosophical belief will defeat the claim. The same is true for a 
claim of discrimination: there needs to be a protected characteristic.  
The arguments on behalf of the claimant  continued with the assertion that the 
Explanatory Notes to the 2010 Act made it clear that a definition of philosophical belief 
under the Equality Act 2010 was a broad one in line with the rights granted under the ECHR; 
and paragraph 52 of the Notes clarified what amounted to a protected characteristic under the 
category of philosophical beliefs as having the following criteria: 
a. The belief must be genuinely held and not a mere opinion or viewpoint on the 
present state of information available; 
b The belief must be a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour; 
c. The belief must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and 
importance and be worthy of respect in a democratic society; and 
d. The belief must be compatible with human dignity and not conflict with the 
fundamental rights of others.10 
These statements of law are correct, though the quasi-legal authority bestowed upon the 
Explanatory Notes is  troubling, especially since the neither the Explanatory Notes nor the 
Tribunal noted that these four tests actually originated in the Employment Appeal Tribunal’s 
judgment in Grainger11at paragraph 24.12 
Counsel for the claimant argued that vegetarianism was clearly a weighty and 
substantial aspect of human life and behaviour, for several reasons. Many vegetarians – 
including the claimant – were genuine in their belief and there was no sensible argument to 
suggest that the belief system behind vegetarianism was made up or fanciful. Equally, no-one 
could sensibly deny that many vegetarians based their genuine belief on the premise that it 
was wrong and immoral to eat animals and subject them and the environment to cruelty and 
perils of farming and slaughter; and that was not a mere opinion or viewpoint based on the 
present state of information available but a serious belief integral to their way of life. Finally, 
 
9 So, ‘a white worker who sees a black colleague being subjected to racially abusive language could have a case 
of harassment if the language also causes an offensive environment for her’: Explanatory Notes, para 100. 
10Conisbeepara 15.  
11Grainger PLC v Nicholson[2009] UKEAT 0219/09/0311at para 24. 
12 In Grainger, they were articulated as five tests, with the first test given here split into two.  
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a fifth of the world’s population was vegetarian; the belief attained a high level of cogency, 
seriousness and importance and was certainly worthy of respect in a democratic society – and 
no-one could sensibly argue that it was incompatible with human dignity and conflict with 
other fundamental rights.13 
Three cases were cited in support of that contention:14 
(i) Williamson,15 in which the issue was whether or not Christian parents could delegate 
their right to inflict corporal punishment on their children to their children’s teachers 
– in particular, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe’s statement at paragraph 55 that 
‘Pacifism and vegetarianism and total abstinence from alcohol are uncontroversial 
examples of beliefs which fall within Article 9’; 
(ii) Grainger, in which a belief in a man-made climate change was held to be capable of 
qualifying as a philosophical belief; and 
(iii) Redfearn,16 in which the European Court of Human Rights held that the UK was 
obliged to provide for the protection of political beliefs – in Mr Redfearn's case, his 
dismissal after being elected as a Bradford City Councillor for the British National 
Party – regardless of how shocking or disturbing those beliefs might be. 
Although Counsel for the Claimant was correct to assert, citing Eweida v UK,17 that 
Employment Tribunals have drawn on ECHR jurisprudence on the issue,18 the assertion that 
‘the definition of s.4 characteristics is aligned with the rights guaranteed under the ECHR’ is 
not quite right. While the Equality Act 2010 defines ‘belief’ as ‘any religious or philosophical 
belief’ or lack of such belief and therefore requires non-religious beliefs to be philosophical, 
by contrast, Article 9 does not distinguish between philosophical and non-philosophical 
beliefs. Moreover, it is now unclear as to when political beliefs are protected under 
discrimination law.19 In Kelly v Unison20it was suggested that a distinction could be drawn 
between ‘political beliefs which involve the objective of the creation of a legally binding 
structure by power or government regulating others’, which are not protected, and the beliefs 
that ‘are expressed by his own practice but where he has no ambition to impose his scheme 
on others’, which may be protected. And possibly to confuse matters even further, an 
 
13Ibid. para16. 
14Ibid. paras19 & 20. 
15R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] UKHL 15. 
16Redfearn v The United Kingdom 47335/06 [2012] ECHR 1878. 
17 (2013) 57 EHRR 8 
18Conisbee, para 19. 
19See, further, R Sandberg, ‘Are Political Beliefs Religious Now?’(2015) 175 Law and Justice 180. 
20[2009] ET 2203854/08 (22 December 2009), para 114. 
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Employment Tribunal held recently in McEleny21that the claimant’s belief in Scottish 
independence amounted to a philosophical belief within the meaning of s.10(2) of the 
Equality Act 2010and could be relied upon as a protected haracteristic for the purposes of 
claiming direct discrimination under s.13. 
 
The Arguments for the Respondents 
 
On behalf of the Respondents, counsel then proceeded  to elucidate the legal definition of  a 
philosophical belief and here expressed it as requiring nine tests. They were as follows:  
a. The belief must be genuinely held; 
b. It must be a belief, not an opinion or viewpoint; 
c. It must be a belief as to a weight in substantial aspect of human life and behaviour; 
d. It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance; 
e. It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society and not be incompatible with 
human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others; 
f. It must have a similar status or cogency to religious belief; 
g. It need not be shared by others; 
h. Whilst support of a political party does not in itself amount to a philosophical 
belief, a belief in a political philosophy or doctrine might qualify; 
i. A philosophical belief may be based on science.22 
The first four tests are as laid out in Grainger, while the remainder seek to distil sentiments 
expressed in the case law –but the extent to which some of these have become firm 
requirements may be questioned. 
The most objectionable test, however, is (f). It is true that the Strasbourg case law on 
Article 9 and various domestic courts and tribunals have said that a belief needs to be 
cogent.23Indeed, in this respect (f) repeats (d). However, there is no legal requirement that a 
philosophical belief must have a ‘similar status’ to a religious belief.24 Yet, for the purpose of 
discrimination law, the requirement that philosophical beliefs must be similar to religious 
ones has been removed: it had been included in the Employment Equality (Religion or 
 
21Mr C McEleney v Ministry of Defence [2018] ET S/4105347/2017. 
22Conisbee, para 25. 
23 For instance, in Williamson, Lord Nicholls said at para 23 that ‘the belief must also be coherent in the sense of 
being intelligible and capable of being understood’. 
24Lord Nicholls in Williamson said that in relation to Article 9 a non-religious belief ‘must relate to an aspect of 
human life or behaviour of comparable importance to that normally found with religious beliefs’: Ibid,  para 24.  
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Belief) Regulations 2003 but it had been removed by the Equality Act 2006. The only 
evidence to the contrary can be found in a House of Lords debate in which the then Minister 
of State for Home Affairs, Baroness Scotland of Asthal, said that ‘the term “philosophical 
belief” will take its meaning from the context in which it appears; that is, as part of the 
legislation relating to discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief.  Given that context, 
philosophical beliefs must always be of a similar nature to religious beliefs’.25 
Counsel for the Respondents contended that the claim that vegetarianism is a belief 
‘fails on one or some of all of b, c, d and f above’. 26 In respect of (b),it was argued that Mr 
Conisbee’s assertions in his witness statement that it was his belief that ‘…animals should 
not be bred, caged or killed for the purposes of food’ and that ‘I happen to believe that the 
environment would be a better place without slaughtering animals for food’ were merely  an  
opinion  or viewpoint.27McClintock28 was quoted as holding that where a Justice of the Peace 
objected to adoption by same sex couples but ‘had not as a matter of principle, rejected the 
possibility that such adoptions could ever be in a child’s best interest’ then that amounted to 
an opinion rather than a belief.  However, the facts in McClintock seem distinguishable from 
the witness statement; as quoted, it does not support the contention that Mr Conisbee’s  
convictions on vegetarianism were not principled, nor was there any evidence that he had 
even hinted that his mind was not completely made up and that he had conceded that there 
was a rationale for eating meat.  
In respect of (c), Counsel argued that vegetarianism failed the ‘weighty and 
substantial aspect of human life’ test because it was not about human life and behaviour but 
about preserving the life of animals and fish.29This also seems to miss the point. Both 
religious and philosophical beliefs can be about things other than human life. This 
requirement relates not to the content of a belief but the importance of the conviction to 
humans. A belief about the environment, nature or animals should not fail the test simply 
because the content of the belief does not directly concern humans. That would be absurd. 
Indeed, vegetarianism does concern humans: it is the conviction that humans should not eat 
meat.  The recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change stated that 
 
25 HL Deb 13 July 2005 c1110. 
26Conisbee, para 26.  
27Ibid. para 28. 
28McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs(2007) UKEAT/0223/07/CEA.  
29Ibid. para 29. 
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‘Livestock on managed pastures and rangelands accounted for more than one-half of total 
anthropogenic N2O emissions from agriculture in 2014’30 and that: 
‘Balanced diets, featuring plant-based foods, such as those based on coarse grains, 
legumes, fruits and vegetables, nuts and seeds, and animal-sourced food produced in 
resilient, sustainable and low-GHG emission systems, present major opportunities for 
adaptation and mitigation while generating significant co-benefits in terms of human 
health’. 
In respect of (d), Counsel contended that it also failed the test of cogency, seriousness 
and importance.  Here a distinction was drawn between vegetarianism and veganism. 
Counsel submitted that while ‘such arguments might be advanced for veganism(where the 
belief held by each vegan is fundamentally the same)’: 
‘there are many different reasons for why one might be a vegetarian. Accepted 
reasons might be, a respect for sentient life, moral concern about the raising and 
slaughter of animals, health/diet benefits, environmental concerns, economic benefit 
and/or personal taste. Therefore, as there are at least six different reasons for why one 
might be a vegetarian there is no cogency or cohesion in that belief. Furthermore, 
many people might practice [sic] vegetarianism at some stage in their life but not 
maintain the practice.   For many, the practice is neither serious nor important’.31 
Counsel for the Respondents had recited the Oxford English Dictionary definition of a 
vegetarian as ‘a person who does not eat meat or fish and sometimes other animal products 
especially for moral, religious or health reasons’ and contrasting this with a vegan, a ‘person 
who does not eat or use animal products’.32 This led the tribunal to summarise the difference 
like this: ‘vegetarianism is genuinely accepted to be the practice of not eating meat or fish’ 
while ‘veganism is a practice of abstaining from both the consumption of and use of animal 
 
30Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2019) ‘Climate Change and Land: An IPCC Special Report on 
climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse 
gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems’, available at <https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2019/08/Edited-
SPM_Approved_Microsite_FINAL.pdf>. 
31Ibid. para 30. 
32 It is not stated which edition of the Oxford English Dictionary was used to provide these definitions. The 
definitions in the online version are slightly different but come to the same conclusion: vegetarianism is ‘the 
principles of practice of vegetarians; abstention from eating meat, dish, or other animal products’;a vegetarian is 
‘a person who abstains from eating animal food and lives principally or wholly on a plant-based diet, esp, a 
person who avoids meat and often fish but who will consume dairy products and eggs in addition to vegetable 
food’; veganism is ‘the beliefs of practice of vegans; abstention from or avoidance of all food or other products 
of animal origin;  and the definition of a vegan is ‘a person who abstains from all food of animal origin and 
avoids the use of animal products in other forms’.  It is interesting that the OED online refers to vegetarianism 
as a practice and veganism as a belief.  
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products’. Although such a distinction can be made,33 it is questionable whether there is a 
need to distinguish the two in defining vegetarianism. Moreover, it can be questioned 
whether this distinction means that veganism meets the test, but vegetarianism does not.  It is 
difficult, though not impossible, to see why it might be thought intellectually inconsistent to 
be against the slaughter of animals for food but to drink milk and eat butter. The objection of 
vegetarians is, surely, to raising animals specifically for slaughter, and dairy cattle are raised 
for milk, not for meat – but, as every listener to The Archers34knows, regular calving is 
necessary for continued annual lactation and most of the bull calves from a dairy herd go to 
the abattoir. 
This reasoning also applied to (f), in which Counsel arguing that vegetarianism was 
‘some way removed from veganism’ and was a far less serious belief – and therefore fell 
short of attaining the level of cogency or seriousness similar to a religious belief.35 
Finally, Counsel argued that Parliament had not intended that vegetarianism should be 
a protected characteristic. In spite of the opinion of the Equalities and Human Rights  
Commission to the contrary, the Government Equality Office had issued a statement to the 
effect that the Government did not share the view that climate change or veganism were 
religious beliefs, while conceding that interpretation was a matter for the Courts;36 further, 
Baroness Warsi had said in the House of Lords37 that ‘To include cults and other lifestyle 
choices such as vegetarianism and veganism is to make something of a farce of the debates 
that we had’.38 It is worth comparing this with Lord Walker’s remarks inWilliamsonthat 
vegetarianism was an uncontroversial example of a belief that attracted the protection of 
Article 9 ECHR – though, admittedly, his comment was obiter and not central to the issue 
before the Court: the right or otherwise of parents to give permission for teachers to beat their 
children for misbehaviour. We would contend that neither the asides of Lord Nicholls nor the 
views of Baroness Warsi quoted above are definitive in dealing with this issue. 
 
 
33According to the Vegetarian Society and the European Vegetarian Union, a vegetarianis someone who does 
not eat any meat, poultry, game, fish, shellfish or by-products of animal slaughter. Some vegetarians avoid all 
animal flesh but consume dairy products and eggs, some avoid animal flesh and eggs, but consume dairy 
products, and some avoid all animal products except eggs. Vegans, on the other hand, avoid allanimal and 
animal-derived products. For further details, see European Vegetarian Union (20180, ‘EVU Position Paper: 
Definitions of “vegan” and “vegetarian” in accordance with the EU Food Information Regulation’, available at 
<https://www.euroveg.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/EVU_PP_Definition.pdf >. 
34 BBC Radio 4: formerly‘An everyday story of countryfolk’: now badged as ‘Contemporary drama in a rural 
setting’: tum-ti-tum-ti-tum-ti-tum.  
35Ibid. para 31. 
36Ibid. para 33. 
37 HL Deb 23 March 2010 c853. 
38Conisbee para 34. 
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The Tribunal's Conclusions 
 
In deciding that vegetarianism was not ‘capable of satisfying the requirement and definition 
of being a philosophical belief under the Equality Act 2010’, the Employment Tribunal 
applied the four tests provided  by counsel for the claimant as outlined in paragraph 52 of the 
Explanatory Notes to the Equality Act (and as originally laid out in Grainger). However, the 
Tribunal also applied test (f) as put forward by the respondents.  
It was accepted that Mr Conisbee was a vegetarian and he had a genuine belief in his 
vegetarianism.39 However, the Tribunal considered that his ‘viewpoint that the world would 
be a better place if animals were not killed for food ... does not seem to be a belief capable of 
protection’. Employment Judge Postle stated that ‘it is simply not enough to have an opinion 
based on some real, or perceived, logic’. It is unclear what was meant by this. As discussed 
above, Mr Conisbee seems to be in a different position from that of Mr McClintock in the 
case which distinguished opinions from beliefs. There is no suggestion here that Mr Conisbee 
was continuing to weigh up the evidence. Rather,  Employment Judge Postle seems to be 
questioning and critiquing the logic of Mr Conisbee’s conviction and deeming it not worthy 
of protection. 
That is improper.  It has long been established that while courts may be concerned 
with whether or not the claim of religious belief was made in good faith, they are not 
concerned whether the religious belief professed is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in terms of judging its 
validity.40  As Lady Hale put it in Williamson, it is not the role of the court ‘to consider the 
nature of religion, still less is it required to consider whether a particular belief is soundly 
based in religious texts. The court’s concern is with what the belief is, whether it is sincerely 
held, and whether it qualifies for protection under the Convention’.41 
Employment Judge Postle then found that the requirement that a belief must be a 
weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour was not met:  
‘The Tribunal asks itself, is the belief weighty and a substantial aspect of human life 
and behaviour? Here the Tribunal endorses ... the Respondents’ argument that 
vegetarianism is not about human life and behaviour, it is a lifestyle choice and in the 
Claimant’s view believing that the world would be a better place if animals were 
not killed for food.  Clearly an admirable sentiment, but cannot altogether be 
 
39Ibid. para 39. 
40R Sandberg, ‘Controversial Recent Claims to Religious Liberty’ (2008) 124 LQR  213, 214. 
41Per Lady Hale, at para 75. 
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described as  relating to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and 
behaviour.’42 
As discussed above, the respondent’s argument that this test was not met because the 
belief related to animals rather than to humans is nonsensical. The articulation here of Mr 
Conisbee’s conviction as ‘believing the world would be a better place if…’ seems to go 
beyond being an ‘admirable sentiment’ and is, rather, the type of expression one would find 
in most beliefs. It very much sounds like a ‘world-view’: the very thing that courts have used 
as a synonym for a belief.  
The Tribunal concluded that neither was the requirement that the belief had a certain 
level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance met, even though it was worthy of 
respect in a democratic society:  
‘The Tribunal asks itself, does the Claimant’s belief attain a certain level of cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion and importance? Here the Tribunal reminds itself it must guard 
against applying too stringent standards, that is to say, set the bar too high. The 
Tribunal do accept there are many vegetarians across the world, however, the reason 
for being a vegetarian differs greatly among themselves, unlike veganism, where the 
reasons for being a vegan appear to be largely the same. Vegetarians adopt the 
practice for many different reasons; lifestyle, health, diet, concern about the way 
animals are reared for food and personal taste. Vegans simply do not accept the 
practice under any circumstances of eating meat, fish or dairy products, and have 
distinct concerns about the way animals are reared, the clear belief that killing and 
eating animals is contrary to a civilised society and also against climate control [sic]. 
There you can see a clear cogency and cohesion in vegan belief, which appears 
contrary to vegetarianism, i.e. having numerous, differing and wide varying reasons 
for adopting vegetarianism.43 
 This seems uncritically to adopt the respondent’s questionable distinction between 
veganism which, it is argued, does meet this requirement and vegetarianism which, by 
contrast, it is argued does not.  The Tribunal’s contrast between the ‘clear cogency and 
cohesion in vegan belief’ and the ‘numerous, differing and wide varying reasons for adopting 
vegetarianism’ are far from conclusive. Peter Edge suggests that Postle’s ‘monolithic view of 
veganism is odd’ and points out that, in reality, people hold vegan beliefs for a variety of 
reasons: 
 
42Ibid. para 40. 
43Ibid. para 41. 
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‘there are atheist vegans and Buddhist vegans, for instance – both are vegans, but the 
atheist vegan probably would not understand their veganism on the basis of the 
Buddhist teachings around dukkha and samsara that a Buddhist vegan might. The 
specifics of vegan practice may also differ very widely between individuals – as a 
cursory consideration of honey consumption reveals’.44 
The same could be said of other philosophical beliefs. Very few would suggest that 
Marxism as expounded in Das Kapital, for example, does not ‘attain a certain level of 
cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance’ and many Marxists hold their views 
tenaciously. However, they also have a history of disagreeing among themselves about 
exactly what their philosophy is about and what it entails in policy terms. The same can also 
be said for Conservatism in its British manifestation: as to its current internal 
disagreements, simonumentumrequiris, circumspice. Or compare and contrast Christianity as 
espoused by the Orthodox Church with Christianity as taught by the Strict and Particular 
Baptists. 
Furthermore, ‘seriousness’ is at least to some extent in the eye of the beholder. When 
the Supreme Court held in Hodkin45that Scientology was a religion for the purposes of 
registering its chapels as places of worship under section 2 of the Places of Worship 
Registration Act 1855 it was surely correct to do so. To most non-Scientologists, however, its 
core doctrines do not appear to be ‘serious’ at all. 
Finally, while the previous reasons given by the Tribunal are questionable 
interpretations and applications of  the law, it  the issue with the final test applied is whether 
it is a legal requirement at all.  The Tribunal found that the belief must have a similar status 
or cogency to religious beliefs. Clearly, having a belief relating to an important aspect of 
human life or behaviour is not enough in itself for it to have a similar status or cogency to a 
religious belief.46 
As discussed above, it is questionable whether a philosophical belief must be similar 
to a religious one in order to be protected. Even ignoring this, the second sentence seems 
confused. Here Employment Judge Postle seems to be conceding that vegetarianism does 
relate to an important aspect of human life. This contradicts his findings in relation to 
weightiness. Moreover, one might reasonably ask this: if a belief about an important aspect of 
 
44Peter Edge, ‘Vegetarianism as a Protected Characteristic: Another View on Conisbee’ in Law & Religion UK, 
21 September 2019, http://www.lawandreligionuk.com/2019/09/23/vegetarianism-as-a-protected-characteristic-
another-view-on-conisbee/. 
45R (Hodkin & Anor) v Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] UKSC77. 
46Conisbee para 43. 
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human life is not sufficiently similar to a religious belief in terms of status or cogency to 
attract protection, what non-religious belief could possibly satisfy that requirement?  
 
Conclusion  
At best, Conisbee could be described as a muddled judgment; at worst, it is seriously flawed. 
There is a debate to be had over whether vegetarianism should be protected as a belief under 
equality laws. Our concern here has not been to argue this one way or the other but rather to 
show that the way in which the law was articulated, interpreted and applied in this decision is 
deeply suspect.  There was arguably no need to distinguish between vegetarianism and 
veganism at all in this case – but even if there were, the casting of veganism as being 
ideologically certain against the alleged haphazard nature of vegetarianism is a caricature. 
Moreover, the notion that disagreement amongst adherents means that their convictions 
cannot be protected as a belief is both ludicrous and dangerous since it invites courts and 
tribunals to assess questions of doctrine.  
As Edge points out, other decisions, particularly at Employment Tribunal  level, have 
held comparatively narrow beliefs to be protected.47 He suggests that, though a belief that 
animals should not be killed and eaten is definitely narrower than ethical veganism, itis wider 
than the belief that animals should not be hunted for recreational purposes.I n Hashman,48 for 
example, in which the vegan claimant had emphasised his philosophical objections to blood-
sports on the basis that he opposed taking pleasure from the killing of animals, the 
Employment Tribunal had concluded that a principled objection to blood-sports was a 
protected belief.49And climate change, it should be remembered, was accepted in Grainger as 
a philosophical belief that met the test of cogency, seriousness and importance.  Conisbee is 
therefore yet another addition to a very inconsistent jurisprudence. It is to be hoped that it is 
appealed and that it results in this area of law having, at long last, a degree of cogency 
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